Skip to content

Facebook-f(https://www.facebook.com/PetraTheSpectator)

Instagram(https://www.instagram.com/peachpw/?r=nametag)

Youtube(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrBIMyKpyweRG9Q4UdxncNQ)

Home(https://petrathespectator.com/) » BRICS: When the Rules of the World Begin to Shift

BRICS: When the Rules of the World Begin to Shift

The 18th BRICS Summit held September 12 – 13, 2026, brought together an expanded grouping whose membership represents nearly half of the world’s population and approximately 40 percent of global GDP. Beyond the numbers, the conversations in New Delhi revealed something more consequential: the Global South is looking to impact the rules and power base of the world order.

Chinese President Xi Jinping placed the moment within a changing global landscape. He said, “ The world is undergoing accelerated transformation unseen in a century ,” pointing to a Global South is rapidly growing in strength and moving toward a multipolar world he described as “ unstoppable .”

Family photo with leaders of BRICS Member/Partner Countries Outreach Invitees and Heads of International Organisations at the 18th BRICS Summit, in Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi on September 13, 2026. Photo source: The Government of India’s Prime Minister’s Office / Press Information Bureau (PIB)

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi approached the same question from a different angle. He described BRICS as reaching a “ coming of age ” moment and argued that developing countries should no longer simply accept rules created elsewhere. In Modi’s formulation, the Global South must become a “ rule-shaper .” Modi also pushed back against the idea that BRICS is anti-Western. “ BRICS is not against anyone ,” he said, while arguing for a larger role for developing countries in global governance.

Those two ideas deserve to be considered together. This is not necessarily a conversation about replacing one global power with another. It is increasingly a conversation about whether the international table itself can become larger, expanding to include countries historically seated around its edges.

For the Caribbean, that is not an academic question. Whether the issue is climate finance, debt, trade, correspondent banking, artificial intelligence, development financing or the reform of international institutions, small states know very well what it means to live with decisions made in rooms where their voices carry considerably less weight. The question, therefore, is not simply whether BRICS is becoming more powerful. It is whether this changing distribution of global power creates greater space for countries such as ours.

What is BRICS?

BRICS began in 2006 as BRIC, bringing together Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined four years later, adding the “S” and giving the grouping the name by which it is now known. It has since expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The 11 members now make up nearly half of the world’s population and account for about 40 percent of global gross domestic product.

BRICS 2026: Leaders and representatives gather for a group photograph at the 18th BRICS Summit, held at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, India, in September 2026. Photo source: The Government of India’s Prime Minister’s Office / Press Information Bureau (PIB)

That economic and demographic weight gives the grouping increasing significance. BRICS has long sought greater influence for developing economies within institutions traditionally dominated by Western powers. It has pushed for reform of bodies including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

The New Delhi Summit suggested this ambition is broadening. BRICS wants greater representation within the existing architecture, and a stronger role for the Global South in determining how that architecture evolves.

From Rule-Takers to Rule-Shapers

This may be the most important message for the Caribbean. For decades, developing countries have argued that leadership and decision-making in international institutions do not adequately reflect the distribution of population, economic activity, vulnerability, or development needs worldwide. Modi’s “rule-shaper” formulation puts that frustration into remarkably simple language: the Global South should not merely receive rules; it should help create them.

Xi expressed the same broad ambition differently, calling on BRICS countries to “ firmly stand on the right side of history ” and become pioneers in innovative development, maintain peace and stability, facilitate mutual learning between civilizations, and reform and improve global governance. He argued that BRICS countries should help steer the international order toward “greater justice and equity” while working toward a “ community with a shared future for humanity .”

There are ideological and geopolitical layers to those formulations, of course. But beneath them sits a straightforward question with particular relevance for developing countries: Who gets a meaningful voice when the international rules are written?

Why Rules Matter Particularly to Small States Modi explicitly rejected the notion that BRICS should be viewed through the prism of geopolitical rivalry, often framed as China and Russia on one side and the United States and its Western allies on the other. Modi stated, “ BRICS is not against anyone, ” a distinction that matters enormously for the Caribbean.

The Caribbean interests are not served by replacing dependence on one powerful centre with another. The region should not approach international relations as geopolitical fandom, choosing teams and defending colors. Small states require something considerably more sophisticated. We need relationships that expand our room to manoeuvre.

A genuinely multipolar world could provide more sources of investment, technology, development finance, markets and diplomatic partnerships. It could also give developing countries greater leverage when negotiating the terms on which those relationships are built. But multipolarity carries risks too. More powerful centres can mean more choices and greater pressure to choose.

Xi’s emphasis on the international order is especially relevant here. BRICS countries, he argued, should steer that order toward greater justice and equity while addressing growing “ deficits in peace, development, security and governance .” For large powers, international rules coexist with considerable economic, diplomatic and military leverage. Small states possess far less of that leverage.

Antigua and Barbuda cannot move global markets through the size of its economy. Caribbean states cannot project military power comparable to that of the United States, China, India, or Russia. Much of our protection therefore comes from international law, functioning institutions, alliances, collective diplomacy and the principle that agreed rules should apply regardless of the size of the country invoking them. For small states, we cling to rules as our shield in international negotiations and keep them in mind in bilateral relations.

The important question is therefore not whether the world should have rules. It is who participates in writing them, whether they are applied consistently, and whether the institutions that enforce them adequately represent the countries affected by their decisions.

From Climate Finance to Correspondent Banking

This is where the New Delhi diplomatic gathering stops being distant and starts touching Caribbean shores. Small Island Developing States have spent decades arguing that the international financial architecture fails to reflect vulnerability. GDP per capita can make a Caribbean country appear relatively prosperous while masking extraordinary exposure to hurricanes, climate change, imported inflation, external economic shocks and the enormous cost of rebuilding infrastructure after a single catastrophic event.

Caribbean governments have similarly confronted de-risking and the loss of correspondent banking relationships, advocated for fairer access to concessional financing and demanded substantially greater climate financing. These are all, fundamentally, arguments about rules and representation.

Who decides which countries are eligible for concessional financing? Who determines how vulnerability is measured? Who establishes the architecture of international payments? Who writes the rules governing emerging technologies? And how much influence does a small Caribbean nation have when those decisions are made? That is why Modi’s call for the Global South to become a “rule-shaper” deserves more than passing Caribbean attention.